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Abstract 
The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges 
to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the 
perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree 
to which money is abstract (merely numbers on-screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also 
include psychometric measures of self-control and impulsivity. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible a stronger positive 
association between cooperation and self-control—and a stronger negative association 
between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results shed light on the conditions under which 
self-control matters for cooperation. 
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1. Introduction   
The social dilemma represents not only conflict between individual rationality and the 
collective good, but also one within the individual—between conflicting preferences. More 
specifically, in contexts resembling that of the standard public good game (for surveys on 
public goods experiments, see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003; Gächter, 2007; Chaudhuri, 
2011)—where the group is both abstract and anonymous—individuals are thought to 
experience a self-control conflict between the temptation to act ‗selfishly‘ and the ‗better 
judgment‘ to act in the interest of others (Kocher et al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 2012). To 
date, the question has been explored empirically by correlating levels of cooperation with a 
psychometric measure of individuals‘ trait capacity to exercise self-control (Rosenbaum, 
1980a), with an eye to the question of conflict recognition; self-control matters only to the 
extent that the individual has recognized the decision at hand as a self-control conflict 
(Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). Kocher et al. (2012) theorized about, and found evidence of, a 
positive association between cooperation and trait self-control among participants who 
reported feeling conflicted during the contribution decision—but not among participants who 
reported no conflict. Turning to the causality of conflict identification, Martinsson et al. 
(2010) fitted a subtle framing procedure to the public good game. They found that trait self-
control was more strongly correlated with cooperation in the treatment that raised the relative 
likelihood of conflict identification than in the treatment that reduced the likelihood.  
We explore the same conceptual framework, though from a different vantage point. 
Adapting a procedure for influencing the degree to which money is experienced as tangible 
versus abstract (Reinstein & Riener, 2011), we test the hypothesis that the positive correlation 
between cooperation and trait self-control is stronger in the treatment that renders money 
more tangible, and hence more viscerally tempting (Loewenstein, 1996). Equipped with a 
measure of impulsivity, we also test the converse hypothesis—that the negative correlation 
between cooperation and impulsivity is stronger in the treatment that renders money more 
tangible. We find support for our predictions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on the relation between pro-social behavior and self-control. Section 3 presents our 
model, and Section 4 outlines our experimental design. Section 5 presents the experimental 
results, and Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
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2. Self-control and pro-social behavior 
 
2.1 Conceptualizing self-control  
There are different ways of conceptualizing self-control. A common one, on which we 
rely here, is to understand self-control as a ―cold‖ executive function that guides behavior in 
response to ―hot‖ impulses to act against ‗better judgment‘ (see e.g., Loewenstein, 1996; 
2000; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; O‘Donoghue & Loewenstein, 2007; Hofmann et al., 2009). 
The executive function relies on limited resources, which we may think of as ‗willpower‘ (see 
e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). In turn, the resources may include cognitive strategies to divert 
attention away from temptation (e.g., Mischel et al., 1989), strategies of pre-commitment 
(e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984), or, simply, the strength of mind to resist (e.g., 
Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2013).  
Perhaps not inconsistent with lay intuition, but noteworthy in light of the debate in 
social psychology about ‗disposition versus the situation,‘ there is reason to think that the 
capacity to exert self-control constitutes a relatively stable personality trait. To this point, 
Mischel and colleagues found that a child‘s performance at age 4 on an instant gratification 
task (e.g., one marshmallow now, or two marshmallows later) predicted later in life their 
cognitive control (Eigsti et al., 2006); ability to concentrate, self-control, interpersonal 
competence, SAT scores, and drug use (Mischel et al., 1988; Mischel et al., 1989; Shoda et 
al., 1990; Ayduk et al., 2000). Moreover, for the purpose of capturing trait self-control, a 
number of psychometric measures have emerged, including the Self-Control Schedule by 
Rosenbaum (1980a) and the Self-Control Scale by Tangney et al. (2004). 
The visceral nature—or ‗hotness‘—of the temptation is central to most 
conceptualizations of self-control, both lay and scientific. It is thought that the immediate 
presence of a tempting object—say a newly baked cookie—triggers a stronger urge than does 
a more abstract and distant representation of the object (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). In other 
words, the mere verbal description of a cookie would represent a lesser temptation than would 
a steaming, fresh one, standing in full purview of the hungry shopper. It is for this reason that 
numerous self-control strategies involve ―cooling‖ the temptation, for example, by directing 
attention away from it (Mischel et al., 1989), rendering it more abstract and less tangible (for 
a review, see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), or undermining its perceived value (Myrseth et al., 
2009). And it is for this reason that psychometric scales of trait self-control ask individuals 
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about their tendencies (among other things) to engage in such behaviors (e.g., Rosenbaum, 
1980a). 
 
2.2 Self-control and social dilemmas 
Loewenstein (1996; 2000), followed by O‘Donoghue and Loewenstein (2007), suggest 
that visceral urges or drive-states may motivate ‗selfish‘ behavior, and a growing body of 
empirical work has produced evidence for this hypothesis. Most pertinent to our current 
endeavors are the studies that feature social dilemmas (for a review of social dilemmas, see 
van Lange et al., 2013). 
Several studies have examined the relationship between time preferences and 
cooperation. Taking participants in a standard public good game, Curry et al. (2008) found 
that discount rates were negatively associated with contributions to the public good. Fehr and 
Leibbrandt (2011) elicited time preferences of fishermen in the lab; they found that patient 
(vs. impatient) fishermen exhibited more cooperative behavior in the field, but they found no 
relationship in the lab.4 Furthermore, Burks et al. (2009) report that ―short-term‖ patience—
the β in the β-δ model—is positively associated with cooperative behavior in a sequential 
prisoner‘s dilemma.5,6  
Rand et al. (2012), who explore the association between decision times and cooperation, 
paint a different picture.7 The authors report that shorter decision times are associated with 
more cooperative behavior, and that treatments intended to reduce decision times boost 
cooperation. They conclude that ―default behavior‖ in the typical public good games is to 
cooperate, an idea ostensibly at odds with evidence from studies of cooperation and time 
preferences, and with the framework tested in this paper. 
For the purpose of probing the role of self-control in cooperation, Kocher et al. (2012) 
formulate and test a model in a one-shot, linear public good game; they examine the 
association between cooperation, self-control, risk-preferences, and the contributions of other 
                                                 
4
 Jones and Rachlin (2009) fail to find a correlation between temporal discounting and cooperation in a 100-
person public good game—but their entire procedure is in the form of a hypothetical scenario. That they fail to a 
find a relationship—where others who employ incentivized procedures do—is consistent with conceptual 
framework presented in this paper; there is quite possibly no self-control conflict in a hypothetical scenario. 
5
 There is an extensive literature on self-control and time inconsistency in economics; see e.g. hyperbolic and 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting models by Strotz (1955) and Laibson (1997), the ―planner-doer‖ model by Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981), and the dual-self model by Fudenberg and Levine (2006). For work on procrastination, see 
e.g. O‘Donoghue and Rabin, (1999) and Burger et al. (2011). 
6
 However, Duffy and Smith (2012) report no effect of cognitive load—meant to impair self-control by depleting 
cognitive resources—on outcomes across treatments, in a repeated multi-player prisoner‘s dilemma.  
7
 For a general discussion of the utility and merit of response times in economics, see Rubinstein (2007). 
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players. Consistent with their predictions, cooperation was positively associated with a 
psychometric measure of trait self-control (Rosenbaum, 1980a), and this association was 
moderated by an interaction with risk-preferences; higher risk aversion implied a weaker 
association. Moreover, they find that this interaction is moderated by the degree of 
cooperation of other players, captured by the conditional cooperation schedule from the 
strategy method; individuals feel obliged to contribute, and to expend costly effort in this 
pursuit, to the extent that others are also contributing to the public good. Finally, and also 
consistent with their model, the aforementioned patterns were obtained for individuals who 
reported feeling conflicted during the decision to cooperate—not for those who reported no 
conflict whatsoever. Notably, their study did not feature any experimental treatments, and so 
it left empirical questions of causality unanswered. 
Martinsson et al. (2010) explore one of these questions, namely that of identification of 
self-control conflict. Borrowing an experimental framing procedure from Myrseth and 
Fishbach (2010), also recently adapted by Martinsson et al. (2012) to a dictator game, they 
attempted to influence identification of self-control conflict in a one-shot, linear public good 
game.8 Consistent with their predictions, the frame hypothesized to promote identification of 
self-control conflict—relative to that hypothesized not to—yielded a stronger positive 
correlation between cooperation and trait self-control. This effect was obtained both for 
unconditional and conditional cooperation, and, in the latter case, it was stronger for higher 
levels of others‘ contributions. 
This paper extends a version of the self-control model from Kocher et al. (2012) by 
explicitly incorporating temptation strength, and it examines empirically a new question of 
causality—that concerning the strength of temptation.  
 
2.3 Self-control and dictator games 
Several studies of dictator games reveal a pattern similar to that observed in social 
dilemmas. Piovesan and Wengstrӧm (2009) found that lower response times of participants in 
a repeated dictator game, which lasts 24 periods, are correlated with more selfish choices, 
both across and within participants. These results are consistent with the interpretation that 
individuals‘ default behavior is to act selfishly, and that pro-social behavior requires the 
                                                 
8
 The hypothesized mechanism behind their procedure is consistent with the ―logic of appropriateness‖ 
framework, which assumes that individuals ask themselves, ―What does a person like me do in a situation like 
this (e.g., March, 1994; Messick, 1999; Weber et al., 2004)?‖ It can then be viewed as specifying when a 
particular logic of appropriateness is activated, thereby activating a self-control conflict.   
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successful resolution of a self-control conflict, thereby raising response time. Following the 
same logic, successful resolution of conflict would require cognitive resources, and—
consistent with this idea—Martinsson et al. (2012) show that donations to the Red Cross in a 
one-shot dictator game are positively correlated with participants‘ scores on the Rosenbaum 
(1980a) measure of trait self-control. Moreover, the correlation was found in the framing 
treatment that was expected to raise the relative likelihood of identification of self-control 
conflict—not in the framing treatment that was expected to reduce the likelihood. Aguilar-
Pardo et al. (2013) obtain consistent results; young children who engaged in altruistic sharing 
in a dictator game exhibited later higher scores on an inhibitory control task, a measure of 
executive functioning.  
The picture is less clear for studies that examine the relationship between cognitive load 
and altruistic behavior in dictator games. Hauge et al. (2009) report no effect of cognitive load 
on players in one-shot dictator games, and Cornellisen et al. (2011), find no main effect of 
cognitive load across three low-stake dictator games. Breaking down the data, however, 
Cornellisen et al. (2011) report that cognitive load increases giving among individuals 
classified as ―pro-socials‖ according to Liebrand‘s (1984) measure of social value orientation 
(social preferences), but that there is no effect among the majority of participants, classified as 
―pro-selves.‖ Schulz et al. (2012) report that cognitive load raises the proportion of altruistic 
choices in a repeated ―mini-dictator game,‖ where participants face dichotomous choices, 
between ―fair‖ and ―unfair‖ allocations. 
 
 
3. Model 
 
3.1 Utility 
We assume an agent whose preferences are described by the utility function Ui, which 
consists of three components: 
  
  
 (1) 
 
The first component, ui(πi), is the utility from monetary payoffs. For simplicity, we 
assume that utility is linear in payoffs, and that the utility from monetary payoffs is equivalent 
to the payoff itself, ui(πi) = πi. Our empirical setting is a one-shot linear public goods game, 
( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i i iU u s t f c   
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where πi is the payoff, ei the endowment, ci the contribution level, and m the marginal return 
from the public good: 
 
   (2) 
 
If 0 < m < 1 and m∙n > 1, this payoff function satisfies the requirements of a public good.  
The second component, si(ωi,t,), specifies the cost of exercising self-control. This cost is 
―opportunity-based,‖ following Fudenberg and Levine (2006). The underlying idea is that 
temptation strength is proportional to the appeal of available alternatives and that cost of self-
control is monotonically and positively related to temptation strength. In our case, greed 
grows stronger with a greater difference between the highest possible available monetary 
payoff. Since ci = 0 maximizes monetary payoff, any positive contribution level ci´ reduces 
the monetary payoff and hence  π(0) > π(ci´), for ci´ > 0. We may write the difference between 
the two payoffs as the difference between the payoff function evaluated at zero and the payoff 
function itself. This quantity then becomes   π(0) - π(ci´) = ci – mci = (1 – m)ci. The term (1 – 
m)ci therefore denotes greed and is the  argument of the self-control cost function.  Assuming 
a standard quadratic functional form, we may write the cost of self-control as 
 
 
, (3) 
 
where the self-control cost is moderated by a will-power parameter ωi > 0. The parameter 
 measures the tangibility of monetary rewards, capturing the idea that more tangible 
objects are also more viscerally tempting (see e.g., Lowenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999).  
The third and final component in (4), specifies an intrinsic benefit from 
contributing, similar to impure altruism models (e.g., Andreoni, 1990). 
 
 , (4) 
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where αi > 0 is a utility weight capturing the importance of contributing.  
The motivation behind our modeling approach is to describe an agent with altruistic 
motivations, but who nevertheless feels tempted to be selfish. That is, the agent experiences a 
self-control conflict between her better judgment to act pro-socially and the temptation to act 
selfishly. To resolve this self-control conflict, the agent must expend costly effort. This effort 
is modeled with the approach by Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and implemented into the 
utility function accordingly.9  
We state the utility function in full as  
  
 . 
  
2
1
1
2
n ij
i i i i i
i
t m cc
U e c m c
n



      . (5) 
 
3.1 Predictions 
We present here the main behavioral predictions for the public goods game. 
Maximization of the utility function in (5) with respect to  yields the first order condition 
  
   
 
  
2
1
1 0
i
i
i
t m cm
n



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(6) 
which implies that optimal contribution  is given by (7): 
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2 2
1
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
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This leads us to our main prediction. 
 
                                                 
9
 A similar modeling approach is also employed by Hauge (2010), for the dictator game.  
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PREDICTION 1.  Given that the individual is sufficiently prosocial, such that 1i
m
n
    , 
raising tangibility of money rewards reduces optimal contributions in the public goods game. 
This negative effect on contributions is smaller for higher levels of willpower.  
 
Proof. in Appendix A.  
 
 Because impulsivity, as a construct, ought to be negatively correlated with willpower, 
we also predict the following: 
 
PREDICTION 2.  Given that the individual is sufficiently prosocial, such that 1i
m
n
   ,  
raising tangibility of money rewards reduces optimal contributions in the public goods game. 
This negative effect on contributions is higher for higher levels of impulsivity.  
 
We illustrate our predictions graphically in Figure 1. Prediction 1 implies that the two lines 
converge with higher levels of self-control. Prediction 2, however, implies that the two lines 
diverge with higher levels of impulsivity. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 
4. Experimental design and procedure 
  
4.1 The public goods game 
Our experiment features a public good game, with the following linear payoff function 
for individual i 
 
         
(14) 
where ci denotes the contribution of individual i to the public good. Each individual is 
assigned to a group of four randomly matched individuals, and each individual receives an 
4
20 0.4 ,i i jjc c    
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endowment of 10 experimental points (the experimental currency unit). The marginal per 
capita return (MPCR) from investing in the public good is 0.4, which satisfies the 
requirements of a social dilemma. Assuming that participants are rational and self-interested, 
it is evident that any MPCR < 1 implies a dominant strategy to free-ride. From the perspective 
of social welfare, it is optimal to contribute the entire endowment as MPCRn > 1. 
Our experiment incorporates the preference elicitation and incentive mechanism from 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Participants make two sets of decisions—first, an unconditional 
contribution to the public good and, second, a conditional contribution schedule. The 
unconditional contribution is given as a single integer, satisfying 0 ≤ ci ≤ 10. For the 
conditional contribution, participants indicate how much they would contribute to the public 
good for any possible average contribution (rounded to integers) of the other three players 
within their group. For each of the 11 possible averages from 0 to 10, participants decide on a 
contribution between (and including) 0 and 10. This is a version of the strategy vector method 
(Selten, 1967). 
To ensure incentive-compatibility, both the unconditional and the conditional 
contributions are potentially payoff-relevant. For one group member, randomly determined by 
the toss of a four-sided die,10 the conditional contribution is relevant; unconditional 
contributions are relevant for the other three group members. More specifically, the three 
unconditional contributions within a group, and the corresponding conditional contribution 
(for the specific average of the three unconditional contributions), determine the sum of 
contributions to the public good.  
 
4.2 Treatments 
Our experiment features three between-subject treatments—the cash, token, and 
standard treatments. The purpose of the treatments was to influence the degree to which the 
source of temptation—greed—was tangible. Each of the nine sessions was assigned to one of 
the three treatments, and participants were randomly assigned to one of the nine sessions.  
The treatments were implemented with a procedure adopted from Reinstein and Riener 
(2011). In the cash treatment, participants received their endowment in the form of one-euro 
coins, packaged in envelopes, one for each participant. Participants were instructed to indicate 
their allocation decision on the computer screen and by allocating the coins to two new 
                                                 
10
 Each group member is assigned a number from one to four. The die is rolled by a randomly selected 
participant in the session, and the roll of the die is monitored by the experimenter. 
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envelopes, one marked for self and the other for the public good. Participants‘ payments at the 
end of the experiment were determined by the on-screen decision. Similarly, participants in 
the token treatment received their endowment in the form of ten tokens, packaged in one 
envelope for each participant. Otherwise, the procedure in the token treatment resembled that 
in the cash treatment. In contrast, participants in the standard treatment completed the entire 
decision process on-screen, using z-Tree, without receiving any envelopes or any forms of 
physical representation of their endowments. As such, the baseline treatment followed the 
procedure typically used in linear public good games (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Zelmer, 
2003). 
The crucial distinction between the three conditions is the physical—and hence 
tangible—representation of the endowment. We assumed that a more tangible representation 
of the source of temptation would more likely stoke stronger feelings of greed. This 
assumption is consistent with the work in psychology on visceral influences (Loewenstein, 
1996; O‘Donoghue & Loewenstein, 2007). As the cash condition represents the most tangible 
representation of money—the source of greed in our experimental context—we expected this 
condition to ignite the strongest visceral influences, or temptation. In contrast, the standard 
treatment provides merely an abstract representation of the endowment. We thus expected this 
treatment to elicit the weakest temptation. Consistent with our interpretation, Reinstein and 
Riener (2011) found that charitable donations were lower in the cash than in the standard 
treatment. Finally, while the token treatment provides a physical representation of the 
endowment, the representation is more abstract than is that of the cash treatment. We thus 
expected the token treatment to fall somewhere between the cash and the standard treatments. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
4.3 Measurement of trait self-control and impulsivity 
To measure self-control, we implemented the Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule 
(Rosenbaum, 1980a), henceforth abbreviated Rosenbaum.11 This is a standard psychometric 
measure of trait self-control in the psychology literature. It has been validated against a 
number of relevant personality measures; and against behavioral tasks associated with self-
control, such as resisting pain (Rosenbaum, 1980b); coping with stress (Rosenbaum & Smira, 
1986; Rosenbaum, 1989); coping with mental disability (Rosenbaum & Palmon, 1984); 
                                                 
11
 The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (1980a) is included in Appendix B. 
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managing seasickness (Rosenbaum & Rolnick, 1983); quitting smoking (Katz & Singh, 
1986); saving over spending (Romal & Kaplan, 1995); and curtailing procrastination 
(Milgram et al., 1988). More recently, the Rosenbaum has been found under certain 
conditions to correlate positively with donations in a dictator game (Martinsson et al., 2012) 
and cooperation in a one-shot public good game (Kocher et al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 
2010). 
We also included a measure of impulsivity, adopted from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP; Wagner et al., 2007). It consists of one question: ―How do you assess 
yourself personally: Are you in general a person who thinks carefully before acting, so not 
impulsive at all? Or are you a person who acts without thinking long, so very impulsive?‖ The 
question was answered on an 11-point scale, ranging from ―not impulsive at all‖ (0) to ―very 
impulsive‖ (10).  
 
4.4 Overview of procedure 
The computer-based experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory at 
Technische Universitӓt Berlin, in December 2010, with the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 180 students from all disciplines, except economics, participated 
in nine sessions—three sessions for each treatment—with 20 participants per session. Nobody 
participated in more than one experimental session, and they were randomly assigned to 
treatments. Approximately 66% of participants were male. Sessions lasted up to 1½ hours, 
and the average payoff was 12.9 euro, including a show-up fee of 4 euro.12 
Upon arrival, experimental participants were arranged in separate cubicles. Each session 
started with instructions for the public goods game. The instructions also indicated that there 
would be additional parts of the experiment, but that the instructions for these parts would 
only be provided after the completion of the current part. It was further stressed to participants 
that decisions in one part would be completely unrelated to those in the other parts. 
Participants received neutrally framed, written instructions (see Appendix C), on-screen and 
on paper. The instructions were read out loud by the experimenter, who was overseeing the 
execution of the experiment, but not otherwise involved with the research project. Everybody 
had the opportunity to ask questions in private. The experiment continued only after all 
participants had completed a series of computerized exercises (where they calculated profits 
                                                 
12
 Each experimental point earned in the public goods game was  exchanged at the pre-announced rate of 1 point 
= 0.33 euro. 
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for different contribution levels in the public goods game), and after all participants had 
correctly understood the procedures. Participants were informed that feedback and payment 
would only be provided at the very end of the experiment.  
After finishing the public goods game, participants completed the Rosenbaum, the 
measure of impulsivity, and some demographic questions. 
The final stage of the experiment included feedback on the decisions of group members 
in the public goods game and on the individual earnings. Payments were made privately and 
in cash. 
 
 
5. Experimental results 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that unconditional contributions in our sample 
resemble those reported elsewhere (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher & Gächter, 
2010). Also, the Rosenbaum scores correspond roughly to those found in other studies.13 The 
age profile fits that of a typical student population (M = 23.3, SD = 4.1). 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Our two psychometric measures, namely the Rosenbaum and impulsivity, are negatively 
correlated (R = -0.26, p < .01). The relatively low correlation, however, is not a surprise as the 
relationship, at the conceptual level, is not necessarily one-to-one; it is possible to have both 
high levels of trait self-control, as measured by the Rosenbaum, and high levels of 
impulsivity.  
  Our analysis features the unconditional contributions as our tangibility treatments were 
implemented only for this measure; participants were only given cash or tokens to represent 
the endowment and their unconditional contributions. Conditional contributions, across 
treatments, were elicited with a standard variation of the vector strategy method (e.g., 
Fischbacher et al., 2001), where the representation of money is abstract (on-screen). 
                                                 
13
 The grand mean is below the corresponding range of means from the original samples studied by Rosenbaum 
(1980a, b)—M = 18.5 vs. M’s ranging from 23 to 27. It is slightly above that obtained in Germany by Kocher et 
al. (2012) (M= 16.7), but below those obtained in Colombia by Martinsson et al. (2012; 2010, respectively) (M = 
32.1 and M = 29.7) .    
 14 
 
Table 2 presents a regression analysis of the effect of treatments on unconditional 
contributions.14 Consistent with our predictions, specifications (1 - 4) all reveal negative main 
effects for the cash and token treatments. However, statistical significance depends on the 
specification: the main effects are not statistically significant for specification (1) (p‘s > .1); in 
specification (2) the token treatment approaches significance (p < .1), but the cash treatment 
does not (p > .1); and in specifications (3) and (4) the cash treatment is significant (p‘s < .05), 
but the token treatment not (p‘s > .1).15 The general tendency is that the treatments that render 
the endowment more tangible reduce cooperation. These results are consistent with Reinstein 
& Riener (2011), who found that a more tangible representation of endowments reduced 
giving in games of charitable giving. 
The interaction terms in specifications (1) and (2) provide evidence for Prediction 1. In 
the cash treatment, specifications (1) and (2) both yield a positive association between the 
Rosenbaum and contributions, the former significant (p < .05) and the latter approaching 
significance (p < .1). Similarly, in the token treatment, specifications (1) and (2) both yield a 
positive association between the Rosenbaum and contributions, both approaching significance 
(p‘s < .1). In contrast, the standard treatment in both specifications yields a negative and non-
significant association between Rosenbaum and contributions (p‘s > .1). Moreover, in 
testing—directionally—whether the association between the Rosenbaum and contributions in 
the cash treatment is greater than that in the standard treatment, we obtain significance with 
specification (1) (χ2(1)= 3.48, p < .05) and near-significance with (2) (χ2(1)= 1.68, p < .1).16  
We summarize our findings in Result 1, according to Prediction 1: 
 
RESULT 1: In the treatment that renders money ‘tangible,’ there is a positive association 
between levels of trait self-control and cooperation; there is no discernable association in the 
standard treatment, where money is represented abstractly. 
 
We plot in Figure 2 the predicted contributions from specification (2) as a function of 
the Rosenbaum, and broken down by treatments. In line with our predictions, illustrated in 
                                                 
14
 We use a negative binomial regression model, as our data is overdispersed; variance of the raw data is much 
larger than the mean. This violates the assumption of equal variance. This is confirmed by a Likelihood -ratio 
test, which clearly rejects the null hypothesis that Poisson is the appropriate specification.  
15
 Tests are non-directional, unless indicated otherwise. 
16
 Corresponding tests for the token treatment against the standard treatment are significant and near-significant 
at the .05 and .1 levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1, we observe that the lines for the cash and standard treatments converge with higher 
levels of the Rosenbaum. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Turning to Prediction 2, the interaction terms in specifications (3) and (4) provide 
evidence for Prediction 2. In the cash treatment, specifications (3) and (4) both yield a 
negative association between Impulsivity and contributions (p‘s < .05). Similarly, in the token 
treatment, specifications (3) and (4) both yield a negative association between Impulsivity and 
contributions, approaching statistical significance (p‘s < .1). In contrast, the standard 
treatment in both specifications yields a positive and non-significant association between 
Impulsivity and contributions (p‘s > .1). Moreover, in testing—directionally—whether the 
association between Impulsivity and contributions in the cash treatment is more negative than 
that in the standard treatment, we obtain significance with both specifications (1) (χ2(1)= 4.53, 
p < .05) and (2) (χ2(1)= 3.65, p < .05).17 We summarize our findings in Result 2, according to 
Prediction 2: 
 
RESULT 2: In the treatment that renders money more ‘tangible,’ there is a negative 
association between levels of impulsivity and cooperation; there is no discernable association 
in the standard treatment, where money is represented more abstractly. 
 
We plot in Figure 3 the predicted contributions from specification (4) as a function of 
Impulsivity, and broken down by treatments. Consistent with our predictions, illustrated in 
Figure 1, we observe that the lines for the cash and standard treatments diverge with higher 
levels of Impulsivity. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
This paper has examined the hypothesis that cooperation is more tightly associated with 
self-control when an individual‘s endowment is tangible rather than represented more 
abstractly. The intuition behind this hypothesis is that a tangible representation of the 
endowment more likely stokes the temptation of greed, against which self-control would be 
                                                 
17
 Corresponding tests for the token treatment against the standard treatment are non -significant (p‘s > .1). 
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exerted for the better judgment of acting in the interest of the common good. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we find in a public good game that individuals‘ trait self-control is positively 
correlated with contributions to the public good when the endowment is represented 
physically, in coins, but not when represented abstractly, on the computer screen. Moreover, 
and in line with this result, individuals‘ trait impulsivity is negatively correlated contributions 
when the endowment is represented in coins, but not when represented on the computer 
screen.  
Our results add to an ongoing line of research that explores how individuals in social 
interaction act on the basis of ostensibly conflicting preferences. It follows Martinsson et al. 
(2012) in exploring the idea that the question of pro-social versus selfish behavior in general 
may represent one of self-control. And it follows Kocher et al. (2012) and Martinsson et al. 
(2010) in extending this conceptual framework to the social dilemma. The primary 
contribution of this paper is in testing experimentally new predictions from this framework. 
Whereas earlier papers have in common that they either experimentally influenced or 
measured perception of self-control conflict, this paper has focused on experimental 
variations of temptation. It has done so by influencing the tangibility of the endowment in the 
public good game. Moreover, while capturing self-control with the Rosenbaum (1980a) 
scale—like the aforementioned papers—this paper, unlike the others, also provides 
converging evidence with a measure of impulsivity (GSOEP, Wagner et al., 2007). 
Conceptually speaking, our results are consistent with many other findings in the 
literature, most notably that contributions to the public good are negatively associated with 
discount rates (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011). However, our results challenge 
the hypothesis recently advanced by Rand et al. (2012), in their Nature article, entitled 
―Spontaneous giving and calculated greed,‖—that ―our first impulse is to cooperate.‖ 
Specifically, Rand et al. (2012) argue that cooperation represents the ―default‖ behavioral 
response in social dilemmas—the option chosen in the absence of cognitive resources 
required for conscious (―System 2‖) processing. They find support for their hypothesis with a 
series of public good games in which lower reaction times are associated with higher levels of 
cooperation.18 It is hard to reconcile the cash treatment effect—and its moderation by both 
self-control and impulsivity measures—with a story that posits cooperation as the generally 
spontaneous mode of behavior. 
                                                 
18
 Kocher et al. (2012), using a similar setup with German students in a German lab, fail to detect a statistically 
significant association between decision times and cooperation. 
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This paper has relied on the strategy of influencing the degree to which the 
endowment—the source of temptation—is tangible versus abstract. As such, it has rendered 
individuals‘ aptitude at self-control more or less relevant to the decision context. Future work 
might consider pairing this manipulation with a manipulation of the degree to which the 
object of altruism is tangible or abstract. In our context, the object of altruism—the common 
good—is highly abstract; a more tangible representation, such as an image of the 
beneficiaries, might flip the psychological experience of the decision problem. It is quite 
possible that the tangible object of altruism would stoke feelings of empathy (e. g., Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut & Ritov, 2005). The self-control conflict may then stand between 
the temptation to act in the interest of others against the better judgment to act selfishly.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Prediction illustration 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 24 
 
Figure 2. Predicted values of contribution as a function of self-control 
 
 
 
 
Note: Predicted values are based on model 2 in Table 2. The effect of male and age are evaluated at 
their means (Male = 0.66, Age = 23.27). The predicted value of the constant in the model therefore 
becomes 0.963 – 0.187(0.66) + 0.036(23.27) = 1.677. We use values of the Rosenbaum score equal to 
the sample mean (M = 18.46), the mean minus one standard deviation (M-SD = 18.46-21.70 = -3.24), 
and the mean plus one standard deviation (M+SD = 18.46+21.70 = 40.16). 
The predicted value equations by treatment therefore become: 
Baseline treatment:  ci = 1.677 – 0.006Rosenbaum 
Token treatment:  ci = (1.677 – 0.344) + (0.013-0.006)Rosenbaum 
Cash treatment:   ci = (1.677 – 0.258) + (0.011-0.006)Rosenbaum  
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Figure 3. Predicted values of contribution as a function of impulsivity 
 
 
 
 
Note: Predicted values are based on model 4 in Table 2. The effect of male and age are evaluated at 
their means (Male = 0.66, Age = 23.27). The predicted value of the constant in the model therefore 
becomes 0.788 – 0.196(0.66) + 0.030(23.27) = 1.357. We use values of the Impulsivity score equal to 
the sample mean (M = 4.63), the mean minus one standard deviation (M-SD = 4.63-2.23 = 2.40), and 
the mean plus one standard deviation (M+SD = 4.63+2.23 = 6.86). 
The predicted value equations by treatment therefore become: 
Baseline treatment:  ci = 1.357 + 0.047Impulsivity 
Token treatment:  ci = (1.357 +0.044) + (0.047-0.021)Impulsivity 
Cash treatment:   ci = (1.357 +0.477) + (0.047-0.123)Impulsivity 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable n M SD Min Max 
Unconditional contribution 180 4.69 3.27 0 10 
Conditional contribution* 1980 3.05 3.41 0 10 
Rosenbaum 180 18.46 21.69 -41 76 
Impulsivity 180 4.37 2.23 0 9 
Male 180 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Age 180 23.27 4.08 16 52 
Note: There are 60 participants in each of the three treatments. 
          * = variable created using the strategy vector method 
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Table 2. Negative binomial regression results 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.  Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. 
Token treatment -0.281 -0.344* 0.115 0.044 
 (1.53) (1.83) (0.33) (0.12) 
Cash treatment -0.255 -0.258 0.651** 0.477 
 (1.46) (1.52) (2.05) (1.44) 
Rosenbaum -0.007 -0.006   
 (1.35) (1.11)   
Rosenbaum × token treatment 0.013* 0.013*   
 (1.88) (1.90)   
Rosenbaum × cash treatment 0.014** 0.011*   
 (2.08) (1.65)   
Impulsivity   0.065 0.047 
   (1.40) (0.96) 
Impulsivity × token treatment   -0.025 -0.021 
   (0.40) (0.33) 
Impulsivity × cash treatment   -0.150** -0.123** 
   (2.45) (1.97) 
Male  -0.187*  -0.196* 
  (1.76)  (1.87) 
Age  0.036**  0.030** 
  (2.38)  (2.10) 
Constant 1.686*** 0.963*** 1.234*** 0.788* 
 (14.57) (2.64) (4.48) (1.88) 
Lnalpha -0.880*** -0.965*** -0.891*** -0.960*** 
 (3.87) (4.09) (3.74) (3.93) 
n 180 180 180 180 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.013 
Note: absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * = p < 0.1,  
** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Prediction 1. 
 
Recall the agent‘s utility function:  
 
 
  
2
1
1
2
n ij
i i i i i
i
t m cc
U e c m c
n



        
 
Maximization with respect to yields the first order condition 
  
2
1
1 0
i
i
i
t m cm
n



      
And hence optimal contribution  is given by 
 
     *
2 2
1
(1 )
i
i
i
m
n
c
t m


 
  
 

, 
which can be written as  
* 2 21 (1 )i i i
m
c t m
n
   
 
    
 
 
 
The derivative  is then 
*
3 22 1 (1 )i i i
c m
t m
t n
   
  
     
  
 
   
This is negative if  1.i
m
n
   That is, the marginal benefit of contributing is larger than the 
marginal cost of contributing.   Furthermore, the derivative  
 
 
*2
3 22 1 (1 )i i
i
c m
t m
t n


        
     
ic
*
ic
*
ic
t


 29 
 
is negative if  1.i
m
n
    That is, if the marginal benefit of contributing is larger than the 
marginal cost of contributing. This  demonstrates that the negative effect of increasing 
tangibility on optimal contributions is reduced as willpower increases. This proves the 
prediction.  
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Appendix B: Instructions for the public goods game* 
 
1. Baseline Treatment 
Instructions 
 
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully, as your 
payoff will depend on your decisions made in the experiment.  
Please note that the instructions are your instructions; please do not communicate with other 
participants. If you have questions, please talk directly to the experimenter. If you do not 
adhere to this rule, you will have to be excluded from the experiment.  
Your payoff in this experiment will be denoted in points. The exchange rate is: 
1 Point  =  1 Euro 
 
The Decision Situation 
 
Before you learn the full procedures of the experiment, we would like you to explain the 
decision situation that you are facing. At the end of the explanation you will have opportunity 
to answer some control questions to improve your understanding of the situation. 
You will be member of a group of 4 people. Each member of this group is asked to divide 10 
Tokens. You can pay these Tokens either into a private or into a public account.  
 
Your Income from the private account 
For each token in the private account you will earn exactly one point. Nobody else receives 
anything from your private account. 
 
Your Income from the public account 
For each token in the public account each group member will receive the same share. Each 
group member receives the following payoff from the public account 
Income from the public account = Sum of all contributions into the public account X 0.4. 
If for example all members invest 10 tokens each in the public account, then you and the other 
group members receive 40 X 0.4 =16 points from the public account.  
 
Total Income 
Your total income is the sum of the points from the private and the public account 
Total Income = Income from private account + Income from Public account 
 
The Experiment 
In the experiment you will face the aforementioned decision situation. You will do this 
experiment only once. You have ten tokes at your disposal. In this experiment you have to 
make two types of decisions: we will call them conditional and unconditional decisions. 
                                                 
*
 Translated from German 
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 For the unconditional contribution, you just have to decide how much you would like 
to invest in the public project 
 For the conditional contribution, you have to decide how much you would like to 
invest in the public project, given the average contribution of the other subjects 
(rounded to the next higher integer) 
After all participants have made their decisions, a random process determines one member for 
each group, for whom the conditional contribution is relevant. For the other group members, 
only the unconditional contribution is relevant. When you make your decision, you do not 
know whether you will be chosen; you must therefore think about both of your decisions.  
 
The random choice of one member will be determined as follows: Each group member 
receives a number between 1 and 4. One player will roll a 4 sided die. The number will then 
be entered into the computer. If the number drawn corresponds to you number within the 
group, then your conditional decision is relevant for your payoff. Otherwise, your 
unconditional decision is relevant. 
 
 
2. Changes in the Instructions for the Token and Cash 
Treatments 
In experimental instructions we added: 
―Please open the envelope in front of you and take out the tokens (money) and two additional 
envelopes. Please put your unconditional contribution in the envelope labeled PUBLIC and 
the rest in the PRIVATE envelope. Please put the envelopes in the box at the entrance when 
leaving the lab.‖ 
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Appendix C: The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule 
 
Note: * = item is reverse scored. This is the original English version. The study used a German translation. 
 
Directions - Indicate how characteristic or descriptive each of the following statements is of you by using the 
code given below  
 
+3 very characteristic of me, extremely descriptive  
+2 rather characteristic of me, quite descriptive  
+1 somewhat characteristic of me, slightly descriptive  
-1 somewhat uncharacteristic of me, slightly undescriptive 
-2 rather uncharacteristic of me, quite undescriptive 
-3 very uncharacteristic of me, extremely nondescriptive  
 
 
l. When I do a boring job, I think about the less boring parts of the job and the reward that I will receive 
once I am finished. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
2. When I have to do something that is anxiety arousing for me, I try to visualize how I will overcome my 
anxieties while doing it. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
3. Often by changing my way of thinking I am able to change my feelings about almost everything.  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
4. I often find it difficult to overcome my feelings of nervousness and tension without any outside help.*  
  
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
5. When I am feeling depressed I try to think about pleasant events. 
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     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
6. I cannot avoid thinking about mistakes I have made in the past.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
7. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I try to approach its solution in a systematic way. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
8. I usually do my duties quicker when somebody is pressuring me.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
9. When I am faced with a difficult decision, I prefer to postpone making a decision even if all the facts are 
at my disposal.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
10. When I find that I have difficulties in concentrating on my reading, I look for ways to increase my 
concentration. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
11. When I plan to work, I remove all the things that are not relevant to my work. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
12. When I try to get rid of a bad habit, I first try to find out all the factors that maintain this habit. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
13. When an unpleasant thought is bothering me, I try to think about something pleasant.  
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     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
14. If I would smoke two packages of cigarettes a day, I probably would need outside help to stop smoking.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
15. When I am in a low mood, I try to act cheerful so my mood will change. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
16. If I had the pills with me, I would take a tranquilizer whenever I felt tense and nervous.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
17. When I am depressed, I try to keep myself busy with things that I like. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
18. I tend to postpone unpleasant duties even if I could perform them immediately.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
19. I need outside help to get rid of some of my bad habits.* 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
20. When I find it difficult to settle down and do a certain job, I look for ways to help me settle down. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
21. Although it makes me feel bad, I cannot avoid thinking about all kinds of possible catastrophes in the 
future.* 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
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22. First of all I prefer to finish a job that I have to do and then start doing the things I really like. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
23. When I feel pain in a certain part of my body, I try not to think about it. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
24. My self-esteem increases once I am able to overcome a bad habit. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
25. In order to overcome bad feelings that accompany failure, I often tell myself that it is not so catastrophic 
and that I can do something about it. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
26. When I feel that I am too impulsive, I tell myself "stop and think before you do anything."  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
27. Even when I am terribly angry at somebody, I consider my actions very carefully. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
28. Facing the need to make a decision, I usually find out all the possible alternatives instead of deciding 
quickly and spontaneously. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
29. Usually I do first the things I really like to do even if there are more urgent things to do.*  
 
 36 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
30. When I realize that I cannot help but be late for an important meeting, I tell myself to keep calm. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
31. When I feel pain in my body, I try to divert my thoughts from it. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
32. I usually plan my work when faced with a number of things to do. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
33. When I am short of money, I decide to record all my expenses in order to plan more carefully for the 
future. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
34. If I find it difficult to concentrate on a certain job, I divide the job into smaller segments. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
35. Quite often I cannot overcome unpleasant thoughts that bother me.*  
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
36. Once I am hungry and unable to eat, I try to divert my thoughts away from my stomach or try to imagine 
that I am satisfied. 
 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
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Appendix D: Conditional contributions 
 
 
Table 3. Fractions of contributor type by treatment. 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Contributor type
Conditional cooperator 38% (0.49) 47% (0.50) 42% (0.50)
Freerider 25% (0.44) 22% (0.40) 20% (0.42)
Humpshape contributor 8% (0.28) 7% (0.36) 15% (0.25)
Others 28% (0.45) 25% (0.43) 23% (0.44)
Baseline treatment Token treatment Cash treatment
